

MANAGING ISLAMIC PUBLIC SPACE

Responses of Sumantran Malay Muslims toward “Neo-anti Bid’ah Movement”¹

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Abstract: It has been argued by scholars that Indonesia can be a model of religious tolerance to the Muslim world. However, while a dramatic increase of intolerant acts against minorities in 2009-2012 across the country have challenged this argument, how the majority, to some extent, have also suffered due to similar actions by those who are not really representing the majority and how they respond to it has been almost completely ignored by all for a very long time. Cases in which Sumatran ‘traditionalist’ Malay Muslims have to abandon their own mosques in order to avoid disharmony potentials among themselves are significant examples. In this paper I present a valuable harmonious life in Jambi Malay Muslim community despite so many actions that can lead to conflicts. However, I also consider and contextualize the long-run implications of these responses, particularly regarding Muslim’s contestation of Islamic public space and the problem of maintenance of a healthy democratic society.

Keywords: Democratic-society, Malay-Muslim, religious-conflicts, anti-*bid’ah*, public-space.

Introduction

This paper argues that although there is no question how important to uphold religious tolerance for the shake of a healthy

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democratic society, tolerance could have its limitations. When a religious group deals with other religious groups that show potentials to an unhealthy democratic society, attitudes that show too much tolerant might not be best strategy. In addition, when members of religious groups are contesting in public spaces and only one group is allowed to be dominant with no sound ground, in the long run the tolerant groups might be suffered from unwanted consequences in which they feel being defeated because of their tolerance, rather than being viewed as valuable tolerant groups.³ Their voices just could not be heard appropriately, thus they chose to exit. This kind of temporary strategy of facing public space contestation might not be suggested for the seeds of a healthy democratic society. By making use of data collected from a field reasearch in 2011-2012, three questions that this paper attempts to answer are as follows. First how have Jambi Malay Muslims responded to the existance of neo “neo-anti-*bid’ah*” movement in Islamic public space?;⁴ Second, what kind of implication(s) do such response have in the the society, and; Third, how to contextualize such response for the sake of a healthy democratic society.

Since the introduction of the famous and influential work of Jurgen Habermas in 1962, academic works on numerous fields - sociology, politics, communication, or religion, by applying public sphere theory (which has been applied interchangeably with public space) emerged.⁵ For example, Hoexter work on *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*,⁶ Lee Bernstein Gail, Andrew Gordon and Kate Wildmen Nakai who compiled *Public spheres, private lives in modern Japan, 1600-1950*⁷ and Sani who wrote *The public sphere and media politics in*

³ A.O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970); F.G. Sanin, “Fragile Democracy and Schizophrenic Liberalism: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in the Andes,” *International Political Science Review*, 26, 1 (2005): pp. 125-139.

⁴ I will come to a definition of what I mean by “neo anti *bid’a*” soon.

⁵ Jurgen Habermas, Sara Lennox, and Frack Lennox, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article,” *New German Critique* (1974), pp. 49-55.

⁶ M. Hoexter, *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002).

⁷ Gail Lee Bernstein, Andrew Gordon, and Kate Wildman Nakai, *Public Spheres, Private Lives in Modern Japan, 1600-1950: Essays in Honor of Albert M. Craig* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005).

Malaysia Newcastle upon Tyne.⁸ The latest work which focuses on public space and religion in general is the work edited by Silvio Ferrari and Sabrina Pastorelli *Religion in public spaces: a European perspective*.⁹ This literature is important to understand how members of society are being involved in public space and what kind of contribution they can give to a democratic society.

In addition, there have been also a number of important works which particularly focus on its relation to contemporary Islam. Bowen, for example, writes *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space*¹⁰, Abbink writes on *Religion in Public Spaces: Emerging Muslim-Christian Polemics in Ethiopia* and Reetz writes on *public sphere in its relation to Islamic groups in India*.¹¹ In addition, there has been a work looking at how a group of a community responds to the presence of propagation movement which is not favored, that is through the work of Albert O. Hirschman, *Voice, exit, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations and states*.¹² This approach is particularly useful when we analyze the reasons and implications of why certain individuals or groups of Muslims would choose to exit from their own mosques and to look for other spaces (mosques) to perform their prayers and other social and cultural activities as well as what implication this decision has to a healthy democratic society.

While this literature lays important foundation to understand the function of mosques as Islamic public space, reaction and response of Muslims when they encounter differences or propagation from groups that are not favored by the majority in that place is not applicable to the question when a majority Muslim group encounter minorities and

⁸ M.A. Sani, *The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009).

⁹ Pastorelli, Silvio Ferrari, and Sabrina, *Religion in Public Spaces: A European Perspective* (England: Ashgate Pub, 2012).

¹⁰ J.R. Bowen, "Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 30 (2004): pp. 879-894.

¹¹ See J. Abbink, "Religion in Public Spaces: Emerging Muslim-Christian polemics in Ethiopia" *African Affairs*, 110, 439 (2011): pp. 253-274; D. Reetz, *Islam in the Public Sphere* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006).

¹² See A.O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970); F.G. Sanin, "Fragile Democracy and Schizophrenic Liberalism," pp. 125-139.

would chose to abandon their own mosques instead for the sake of harmonious social life outside the mosques.

It needs to be acknowledged here that there have been abundant studies on Malay Muslims in general or Malay Muslims in Malaysia, but there has been so limited studies being conducted on Jambi Malay Muslims of Sumatra. In fact, outside Malaysia, Sumatra is the largest Malay community “Islam remains the most stabilizing, if not fundamental, element of the Malay identity”, ... however, according to anti *bid'ah* movement “there are aspects that need to be perfected or Islamized”.¹³ The worst is that there has been no study, to my knowledge, on how Jambi Malay Muslims manage Islamic public spaces particularly when they encounter their fellow Muslims who introduce different interpretations or practices of Islam against what they have been practicing along their life and ask them to change their old ways of practicing Islam.

In this article, therefore, I intend to present a dynamic contestation between Jambi Malay Muslims and neo-anti *bid'ah* movement from an Islamic public space perspective and to show implications it has from the perspective of a healthy democratic society. I will begin my discussion by presenting a number of cases Jambi Malay groups respond to neo-anti *bid'ah* movement in the region. Then, I will present the strategy of how Jambi Malay Muslims abandon their mosques for the sake of harmonious life which is arguably a pseudo healthy democratic society. After that, I will proceed with framework of the theory of public sphere from an Islamic perspective. Finally, in order to understand why there is contestation among Muslims over Islamic public space, I will present the roots of disagreement among Muslims particularly on the issue of neo-anti *bid'ah* and analyse why Muslim scholars should deal with it for maintaining healthy democratic society.

The Struggle of Jambi Malay Muslims for Social Harmonious Life

In Jambi Malay Muslims, religious and ethnic identity is firmly fused. By origin, every Jambi Malay is a Muslim. Therefore, the original characters of Jambians such as tolerance of Jambi Malay Muslims towards immigrants from other regions and or religion follow this

¹³ N. Saat, “Islamising Malayness: Ulama Discourse and Authority in Contemporary Malaysia,” *Contemporary Islam*, 6 (2012), p. 136.

Malay character. Cases of conflicts between newcomers and the 'indigenous' Jambi as what happened in Lampung, Madura, Aceh, and other regions of Indonesia have never happened in Jambi. The latest census which includes ethnicity shows that the majority of Jambi population is Malay (38%), followed by Javanese (27%), the rest belong respectively to Kerinci, Minangkabau, Banjarese, Sundanese, Buginese and others.¹⁴ Originally, there is no Malay who embraces a religion other than Islam.¹⁵ Initial Islamisation of Jambi started significantly when Jambi sultanate was ruled by Rang Kayo Hitam, the King of the region, around the first decade of the 16th century. Thus, Islam was an identity of having connection with the kingdom. Whoever wanted to be identified with the kingdom, he or she should join the religion of the kingdom, that was Islam. The process took place peacefully without any confrontation with local religions or beliefs. There is no adequate evidence of confrontation which was caused by the introduction of the new religion. School of Islamic law which was then adopted by the sultan was Shafi'i. This then explains why this Islamic school of law rose and was embraced by every Malay Muslim even until today Jambi. After Islam has strengthened, the sultan used the Islamic honor which stated that his legitimacy was the legitimacy of religion. Meanwhile, along with the advent of colonialism, Islam became a source of strength in opposing colonialism.

The harmonious life between Jambi Malay and newcomers relatively remained until the coming of Muhammadiyah (which came from Western Sumatra) in the late 1950s which created small psychological tensions.¹⁶ But the tensions did not last long since it slowly faded away after Jambi Muslim Malay tried to understand the

¹⁴ The percentage of Javanese in Jambi increased dramatically in the middle of 1970s when Jambi became one of the regions that were made as target of transmigration program of Soeharto government of New Order.

¹⁵ Judith A. Nagata, "What is the Malay?: Situational Selection of Ethnic Identity in a Plural Society," *American Ethnologist*, 1, 2 (1974): pp. 331-350. For a comparison, Anthony Miller defines "Malay" today as a dual ethnic and religious identity does not something that comes on suddenly, but rather the result of social transformations that has taken place for centuries. See, Anthony Milner, *The Malays* (United Kingdom: Wiley- Blackwell, 2008), pp. 1-41.

¹⁶ Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, is one of the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, the other is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Both are symbols of moderate Islam in the country since the last two decades. Both are made as references whenever one is talking about religious life in the country.

difference between their Islamic practices and those of the Muhammadiyah. In most cases, Muhammadiyah followers built mosques of their own so that they could freely pass propagation of Islamic views and practices without concerning that they would have conflicts with Jambi Malay origins. The tensions were almost completely gone after the 1980s when Muhammadiyah started to promote more moderate way of their understanding and practice of Islam, known as cultural *da'wa*.¹⁷ Muhammadiyah promoted and implemented their religious beliefs and practices in their own places of worships, mosques and institutions of education. By this way, conflicts over Islamic shared places of worship had been gently avoided. While in their daily life there has been no issue that has made social disharmony among the newcomers and Jambi Malay Muslims. This is due to the fact that most of the newcomers were traders from West Sumatra that once was in the same province of Central Sumatra with Jambi. As can be seen when Islamic space is managed in a well manner, then, there is no significant conflict that can drive people's concern.

However, after the collapse of New Order government and the Reform Era took place, since 1998, this harmonious life among Jambi Muslims as in many cases in other parts of Indonesia, the Islamic Malay indigenous and the newcomers faced a new problem with the emerging of neo-anti *bid'ah* movement which took over what Muhammadiyah used to actively work on.

It has been observed that there are a number of different groups which have similar goals, propagation of neo-anti *bid'ah*, but this paper focuses specifically on one family which has significant impact on the issue of neo-anti *bid'ah* particularly during the period of the study focused on and how Jambi Malay Muslims responded to it. Unlike the way Muhammadiyah used to do, which used the mosques of their own, this family made mosques which belong to traditional Islam for the purpose of propagating their Islamic views and practices.

¹⁷ Muhammadiyah reaffirmed her more moderate approach in *dakwah* activities, known as cultural *dakwah* in the mid of 1980s when her moderate leaders did every effort, such as publishing books. For more details on this, see Suaidi Asyari, *Traditionalist v.s. Modernist Islam in Indonesian Politics: Muhammadiyah & Nahdlatul Ulama in the Contemporary Indonesian Democratic and Political Landscape* (Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2010), particularly chapter IV where the author discusses Muhammadiyah metamorphosis.

In early 2000s, KH Abdurrahman Yusuf, an imam (preacher) sent his son to study Hadith at the University of Ummul Qura in Madina.¹⁸ Abdurrahman Yusuf lived in Jambi city. His name is one of the two names listed under *Ustadz-ustadz penyebar Wahabi di Indonesia* (Lecturers who propagate Wahabism in Indonesia); the other is Ustadz Banani who also lived in Jambi city.¹⁹ Abdurrahman Yusuf has never clearly stated that he was propagating Salafism or Wahabism. The term that he kept referring to when explaining certain rituals of Muslims that he was attacking, was *bid'ah*. Yusuf is not officially associated with any institution of Muhammadiyah or else, such as pesantren, business networks, and others. He was only one of the teachers of *pengajian* (Islamic gathering) which was held in mosques where Islamic rituals accord with Nahdlatul Ulama.

As for any other teachers, Yusuf had daily schedule to give sermons in a number of mosques in Jambi city. This was actually part of his job since he had no other job but doing *da'wa* (preaching Islamic messages). Earlier on, he was very well accepted by Jambi Malay Muslims since he had traditionalist practices of Islam, of the Nahdlatul Ulama. However, in early 2000s, Abdurrahman Yusuf received a number of copies of books from his son from Madina who came back for a break to Jambi when his son brought along with them a number of books. Abdurrahman Yusuf has never mentioned the title of the book neither he brought the books to his *pengajian* but only stated that he had left what he used to practice as far Islamic practices were concerned. At one point, Abdurrahman Yusuf introduced what he had heard from his son to his younger brother, Abdurrahim Yusuf, who also had the same profession as his, giving *da'wa* from one mosque to another. Since then, Abdurrahim Yusuf did the same thing to his older brother, Abdurrahman Yusuf, promoting anti *bid'ah*.

Although in the list of of *Daftar Ustadz-Ustadz Penyebar Wahabi Di Indonesia*, posted at official site of Ummul Qura Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Jakarta, KH Abdurrahman's name is one of the listed names, it can hardly be heard that he is promoting Wahabi or Salafi ideals explicitly.²⁰ All he kept repeating that he was concerned

¹⁸ For the purpose of ethics of the study, all the names in this study have been kept anonymous.

¹⁹ Administrator. *Daftar-ustadz-ustadz-penyebar-wahabi-di-indonesia*. Retrieved 10 02, 2012, from Ummul Qura Boarding School: <http://www.ummulqura.sch.id/>

²⁰ Ibid.

by *bid'ah* activities of Jambi Malay Muslims since he was introduced by his son by sending him books on this matter. The way he promotes what he believes to be the correct practices of Islam can hardly be labelled as Salafism or Wahhabism, but anti *bid'ah*.

There are four strategies of how Jambi Malay Muslims responded to such attacks from neo-anti *bid'ah* movement vis-à-vis their tolerant nature. The very significant response was that they would maintain their harmonious social life although with the cost of abandoning their own mosques when they faced conflicts against other aggressive groups of Muslims such as the neo-anti *bid'ah* movement. This is particularly true when they are in smaller Islamic places of worships such as *mushalla*, *langgar*, *surau* or in big mosques where the religious activities are organized by more tolerant organizers (mosque *ta'mir*).²¹ Thus, it is not unusual that many Muslims who have to walk, ride motorcycles or drive their cars to pray while there are mosques closer to their houses but they do not feel comfortable to pray in.

Although not all the six mosques being observed for this study support this generalization, from cases of mosques that lead to this generalization it can be argued that there might be similar cases in other places where Muslims would respond the same.

The first example of this is in Al-Fityah Mosque in Telanaipura Jambi. This mosque was relatively newly built, in late 1970s, when the neighborhood was just occupied by the earliest inhabitants of the area. However, since it is situated just accross the street from the campus I of IAIN STS Jambi, most of those who perform prayers in the mosque are students, lecturers, more or less educated Muslims. Since the mosque was built up to early 2000s, Islamic rituals and cultural activities which were conducted in or associated with the mosque have followed the Indonesian traditional Islam, as in most mosques in Jambi, such as *dhikr*, *qunut*, youth activities, and others. In the mosque

²¹ Within Indonesian Muslims, Islamic public places of prayers are named as *masjid*, *mushalla*, *langgar* or *surau*. All are places for Muslim prayers, thus they all mean "mosque" in English word. But they have other different architectural styles and functions. While *masjid* generally have minarets, *mibrab*, *mimbar*, all other places of Muslim prayers (*mushalla*, *langgar*, or *surau*) do not. *Mushalla*, *langgar*, or *surau* are mostly built by Muslims whenever a mosque is not available in certain areas or not easily reached both due to far distance or other circumstances such as security reasons. Therefore, on the one hand, *mushalla*, *langgar*, or *surau* mostly limited to function as places for performing daily prayers (*shalat maktubah*), *masjid* on the other hand also function as place for *Jum'at* congregation as well as for other social gatherings.

were also organized regular and organized collective gatherings for *tablilan* (collective *dhikr*) where the chief of the neighbourhood (*Ketua Rukun Tetangga*) make use of it to deliver information both from the government and other social issues of communities in the surrounding areas. These gatherings were mostly attended by senior inhabitants and students who lived around the mosque. There were around 40 participants who attended such activities regularly.

There were and still are usually students who lived in a room attached to the mushalla for free. These students have responsibilities to clean the *mushalla* and recite *adzan* (calling for prayers) for every prayer, particularly *subh*, *maghrib* and *isya* prayers and during Ramadhan every year. They also taught children who lived around the mosque how to recite the Qur'an and basic knowledge of Islam such as how to perform prayers and as such. They also organized other activities of youth who live around the mosque, such as reading *barzanji* and others. Senior female inhabitants also had their own activities in the mosque such as monthly religious discussions where they also used for other social meetings. There were five imams who usually alternately lead daily prayers in the mosque before the present situation. Three of the imams were senior lecturers of IAIN STS Jambi and the other two were graduate from IAIN but worked at other local government offices.

Every thing went smoothly and regularly in the mushalla until first day of Ramadan 2004 when one of the imams proclaimed that he regreted to have performed Islamic rituals as what he had done along his life. He had been taught that all what he had done were *bid'ah* which made him deserved to be sent to hell fire. He urged all of *jama'ah* (congregation participants) in the mosque should also regret and follow his path to leave what they had been practicing. He said that he had left the traditional ways of performing Islamic rituals.

All the *jama'ah* who were in the mosque were shocked, silent and refrain for sometime until one of the imams in the mosque at that time stood up and made a counter statement. This imam said that no one of them had to obey what had been stated by the other imam. Since then, there has been uncertainty who should organize religious and Islamic social and cultural activities which use to be organized from the mosque up until this study was conducted. Until one year later 2005-6, there were arguments took place whenever the imam about to lead prayers. Whenever Abdurrahim Yusuf was in the mosque, he usually, if

not always, managed to be the leader of every prayer. Every time he made any effort that he would be leading the prayers. He kept pointing out that whatever action that did not follow his ways was *bid'ah*. He would not start leading prayers until every one followed what he asked to do. Those who did want to be involved in arguments or conflict would choose to leave the mosque or perform prayers separately and individually in the mosque.

Almost all activities other than regular prayers, such as cultural activities of celebrating the birth day of the Prophet, Islamic New Year, *isra'* and *mi'raj*, and others had also to be stopped. Women activities had to be moved to their houses alternately. The worst thing is that the monthly gatherings of *tahlilan* where the chief of the neighborhood (Ketua Rukun Tetangga) could usually pass on information to the members of the neighbourhood both from the government and other social activities had also to be stopped on the ground as containing *bid'ah* elements.

Since late 2007s onward, all other imams and one by one of *jama'ah* participants had chosen to go to other places of prayers around the area with the reason that it is better to go to other places rather than having conflicts all the times. Strong arguments or word wars for them can lead to fights which are not good for their community. Some others chose to perform their prayers in their houses with similar reasons. Conversation on the issues of Islamic rituals or related to other Islamic issues among the people of the neighborhood were hardly heard. During the time of this study took place, there were only around seven students who become the *jama'ah* but no one of the neighborhood residents. When they were interviewed, the students told the researchers that they had no other choice because they stayed in the mosque for free. Whenever they went back to their villages, they continued, they would perform their prayers as they used to do. They do not want to make the imam upset or to leave the mosque.

However, there are a number of previous students who choose to leave the Al-Fityah mosque and went to other mosques where they could stay in for free. This was off course unfortunate for other students who had to pay a rent house as most students would have to do if they could not help themselves to stay in the mosque with such situation all the times.

In 2009, around two weeks before the first day of Ramadan when Muslims started to fast, the Chief of the neighbourhood (*Ketua Rukun Tetangga*) invited all the imams and seniors of the neighbourhood to have a meeting to solve their problems. All the participants agreed to maintain harmonious life among them despite having different ways of practicing particular Islamic rituals. Thus, it was decided that those who had left the mosque could conduct their Taraweh prayers in the mosque with alternate imam without including the imam who promoted the anti *bid'ah*. The imam promised that while he would not join the Taraweh prayers, he could still perform and become the imam for the daily prayers other than the Taraweh prayers. This is what the rest of Muslims agreed to do up until the present study was conducted. This, however, had not helped many to go back to the mosque for performing prayers other than tarweh prayer.

Data from Al-Ulya mosque Buluran Kenali Jambi tell us similar story. There used to be similar activities mentioned above but it used to have more than one hundred active participants of *pengajian*. Al-Ulya was built in early 1950s where the initial Malay Muslims who lived there those who were born in the area and claimed to be as *penduduk asli* (original inhabitants) as oppose to *pendatang* (new comers). Since it was built there were religious and social activities that were conducted in or initiated from the mosque. In 2003, it started to have bigger and regular *pengajian* with a regular preacher, KH Mas'ud who lived in the area. This was to follow the trends in Jambi in general during that time after the collapse of New Order regime. However, after KH Mas'ud passed away he was replaced by Abdurrahman Yusuf, the propagator of anti *bid'ah*. After one year or so, he proclaimed that he had left his wrong way of performing Islamic rituals in front of participants of *pengajian*. All participants of his *pengajian* (Religious Study Group) were shock including the two initiators and organizers of the *pengajian*, Abdul Rauf Syafi'i and his wife, Siti Solehah. After that day, one by one of the *pengajian* participants left the *pengajian* and some of them even left the congregation prayers too to be done at their houses. Until one day, there were only two participant of the *pengajian* left, the organizers. All other activities joined to the *pengajian* were also ultimately stopped. Finally, the organizers openly recommended the imam to discontinue the *pengajian*. Only a few months before this study took place, small activities started again but there were still very few who joined.

However, in Raudhoh mosque which is located in Telanaipura, traditional Muslims can well maintain what the jama'ah had been doing, the imam and organizers of the mosque were all from senior of Nahdlatul Ulama. They had never let the propagator of neo-anti *bid'ah* to become imam and neither to lead regular prayers. When they were interviewed, they clearly stated that if you allowed people like them (the neo-anti *bid'ah* propagators) to lead us, they will never be able to get their mosque back. So, they never let any rituals to be led by any imam of neo-anti *bid'ah* movement.

Similarly, the mosque of Al-Jami'ah, which experienced to receive a number of callings from the imam of Al-Fityah mosque to stop what they had been practicing, maintained their activities. Next to the mosque of Al-Jami'ah, there is a Ma'had Aly, a university boarding school of IAIN STS Jambi. Both male and female students organized religious, academic and social activities in the mosque, such as discussion, reading *kitab kuning* (lit. yellow books) and training for becoming Islamic preachers, *da'i*. These students organized regular religious chantings before and after daily prayers by using loud speaker. They are clearly heard from Al-Fityah mosque. As reported by the students and a number of lecturers of the Al-Jami'ah mosque, the imam of Al-Fityah had come to Al-Jami'ah mosque a number of times to ask them to stop doing what the imam had heard. Until, one day, the student stated that they would not stop what they were doing whatever the imam had asked them to do.

A different story came from Nurdin Hasanah mosque. In here, the neo-anti *bid'ah* activists were allowed to have their own *pengajian* from which their activists kept inviting other jama'ah of the mosque to join. However, the neo-anti *bid'ah* activists had never joined other groups of *pengajian* although they were encouraged to do so by the organizers of the mosque. Almost in every two days, there are *pengajian* by both neo-anti *bid'ah* and the other Muslims.

Agung Al-Falah mosque (recently known as a mosque of 1000 pillars) shows similar experience of Al-Raudhah mosque. Although there were some experiences where neo-anti *bid'ah* activists intended to propagate their mission, there was no story that tell us they have even had a chance to do so. This is because the mosque is organized by officials from the governor office, including the Vice Governor, Fachrori Umar. Despite Fachrori Umar seems to be tolerant, but when it comes to such issue of anti *bid'ah*, particularly the way it is

introduced, he would show his reluctance to open a space for that matter. Although there have been attempts by various groups to introduce different ways of practicing Islamic prayers, Agung Al-Falah mosque remains as it is since it was built. For example, whenever there is a visit from a ministry from Jakarta, the organizers of the mosque would just inform how Islamic rituals are usually performed there. Thus, there has never been heard any arguments or conflicts among the participants (*jama'ah*) who go to the mosque. Therefore, government interferences seem to be able to maintain the harmonious life both within mosque and outside it. This is of course to suggest that every Muslim who prefers different ways of performing Islamic ritual has to go to other mosques or to build their own mosques. However, this strategy also shows that mosque as public space does not function as it is supposed to.

To sum up, the above presentation shows that there are three main strategies of how Jambi Malay Muslims responded to the propagation of neo-anti *bid'ah* in Jambi. Firstly is to save their tolerant nature of Jambi Malay against religious interest. This is the most significant strategy because they have to abandon their own mosques for the sake of social harmonious life outside the mosques. They still live together and do social activities together outside the mosque. This happens when those who are the propagators of neo-anti *bid'ah* also live in the same area and the imam has also been indoctrinated by anti *bid'ah* teachings. However, when they are asked in more details how they feel after they had to move from their own mosque, they showed that they did not feel comfortable to live outside the mosque if they had to have fights or disagreements all the time. However, those who were neo-anti *bid'ah* did not feel bothered by the loneliness of the mosque. At this point one would question 'so what is the point of conducting *dakwah*' if the result is to make people leaving them. The very essential purpose of *dakwah* is to persuade others to following but not to leaving.

The second most serious reaction is by stopping religious activities of the mosques where religious activities such as *pengajian* was used to be taught by the same interpretation and practices of imam, but the imam does not live in the same area of the mosques. So when the imam proclaimed that he had converted to different ways of practicing Islamic rituals, they would temporarily stop their religious activities in the mosques until they are settled and have opportunities to start again

their activities with different imams or preachers. The imams had to leave the mosque and looked other mosques to continue their propagation of anti *bid'ah*. This is more or less a strategy of zero-sum game.²²

The third strategy is a comparatively win-win solution. This strategy shows that both neo-anti *bid'ah* movement and the organizers of activities in particular mosques chose to others to perform Islamic rituals on their own ways so long as they do not disturb other Muslims. They chose to share space in the mosque. However, in the long run, Muslims who chose this strategy might be just waiting an opportunity to expel those who are different from them or might also be ending with arguments or conflicts to each other.

This study shows that Jambi Malay Muslims did not really matter with the beliefs and practices of those who were different from theirs. This is in line with the nature of Jambi Malay Muslims who welcome newcomers to the region be they from the same religion or not or be they from the same ethnicity or not. Every new comer to the region has been welcome. Their objection, however, on the way these deferent practices were introduced, propagated, or even forced to them. In addition, not only have they practiced their old knowledge of Islam since they were children, but the way the different practice being introduced to them put them as if they were elementary school students as those who were interviewed told their stories to the researchers. This is not to mention that they also have their foundation and argument to practice what they have been practicing. They avoid to having arguments just because the place and time to have such arguments is not appropriate to them, particularly when prayers is about to start.

Claims of *Bid'ah*: Source of Endless Tensions

Both from theological and historical perspectives, there are three significant roots of dynamic of thought in Islam as well as in many cases that have led to unavoidable disagreements, tensions, conflicts or even fights among Islamic societies until today in the Muslim world, wherever they are; *bid'ah*, *ijtihad*²³, and the notion of “saved sect” of

²² See John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstren, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

²³ *Ijtihad* can be defined as to exert one's utmost independent effort in interpreting the Qur'an and Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad in order to arrive at the closest what is

Islam (*firqah al-najiyah*).²⁴ All these three are rooted from three different hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad and all are among the most controversial issues regarding the root causes of disagreements among Muslims along their history. The only difference is how they are taught about the roots, in what kind of neighborhoods they grow up and how they react to the roots in cases they have different interpretation to one being introduced. As far as neo-*bid'ah* is concerned, the very root of conflicts and disagreements refers to the most referred oral tradition (Hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad regarding specifically to illegitimate innovation (*bid'ah*) as follows:

considered to be definitive judgment so that the messages of the two references can be applied empirically and contextually (whenever and wherever Muslim community live). So every single problem faced by Muslims should be responded by a *mujtahid* (an independent Muslim scholar) when there is no (clear, direct) answer from either the Qur'an or Hadith. There are a number of important points that make Muslims having disagreements on *ijtihad*. Among others are those who have the authority to conduct *ijtihad*, whether *ijtihad* can be conducted both in theological and legal field, whether it can be conducted by men only or women can also do the same, whether the door to conduct it has been closed in a certain period of Islamic history or it is always open, whether *ijtihad* can be done collectively or it has to be done individually, and if there are prerequisites to do so, what happens to those who cannot meet the prerequisite, if they just practice Islam as a *muqallid* (blind follower), namely to follow what an authoritative *mujtahid* rules and so forth. These are only among roots of disagreements among Muslims which basically no one can avoid. For more details, see T.J. Al-Alwani, "Ijtihad and Taqlid". *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 8 (1991): pp. 129-142; A. Albarghouthi, "Authority and representation in North America: the Ijtihad Criteria and the Construction of New Religious Authority," *Journal of Islamic Law and Culture*, 13 (2011): pp. 18-33; A. Hasan, "An Introduction to Collective Ijtihad (Ijtihad Jama'i): Concept and Applications," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 20 (2003): pp. 26-46; T. Ramadan, *Title is Radical Reform, Radical Ijtihad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); A. Dankowitz, "Accusing Muslim Intellectuals of Apostasy," *The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)* (2005), pp. 1-6.

²⁴ The question who is the saved sect in Islam is rooted from what is famously called as the seventy three sects Hadith about Muslim divisions after the Prophet. The Hadith states as follows: "The people of the book before were split up into seventy two sects, and this community (Muslim) will be split up into seventy three. Seventy two of them will go to Hell, and one of them will go to Paradise..". In interpreting who is "the one" that will go to Paradise is subject to debates up until this modern era of Muslim community. Every group or interpretation claims to be the saved sect that will go to Paradise. Ideally, debates on this issue of the saved sect will make Islam very dynamic. However, there are times and cases that lead to strong arguments and fights among Muslims.

Verily, the best speech is the Book of Allah and the best guidance is the guidance of Muhammad ibnu ‘Abd Allah (Saw). The worst of all affairs in this religion are innovations. Every innovation is a *bid’ah* and every *bid’ah* is a going astray and every going astray is in the hell fire.

Since the period of the four caliphs of Islam, the first century of Islamic calendar, Muslims had actually divided into two streams regarding what was categorized as *bid’ah*. While one group is in the position that there is only one *bid’ah*, that is *dhalalah* or misguidance, the other group is in the position that there are two kinds of *bid’ah*; *bid’ah dhalalah* and *bid’ah hasanah*. For the second position, within the second *bid’ah* there are also five other consecutive rulings, *jaiẓ* (allowable), *mustahab* (commendable), *makruh* (detestable), *wajib* (obligatory) and *haram* (forbidden). Among what are famously included in the *bid’ah dhalalah* for the first position as follows:

Conversing the intention for worship (*niyyat*) in Arabic words, in addition to what is stated in mind.

Reciting *bismillahirrahmanirrahim* whenever one starts to recite verses of the Qur’an from the first verse (*ayah*) of each Surah during prayer.

Reciting *qunut du’a* in the last *raka’ah* of *subh* (dawn) prayer.

Reciting collective *dzikir* and *du’a* after each collective prayer.

Reciting *talqin* (du’a) and qur’anic recitation/chanting for the deceased in grave.

Reciting Surah Fatihah (the first chapter of Qur’an) in times of celebration or death.

Mawlid: Celebrating the birth of Prophet Muhammad (12th day of Rabi’ al-Awwal in the Hijra Calendar).

Celebrating Islamic New year of Hijrah.

Conducting weekly and monthly gatherings where certain du’a, dzikr (remembering God), and certain surah of the Qur’an are recited.

Offering meals for guests who invited to recite du’a for the death.

Offering Qur’an recitations or other chanting in congregation.

Hiring people to recite the Qur’an at the time of someone’s death.

Celebrating ascension of Prophet (*Israa wa Al-Miraj*) and Hijrah (Prophet's migration to Mecca).

Mourning the martyrs of Badr on the 17th day of Ramadan.

Mourning the martyrdom of Hussain and his family on Muharram.

Major *Bid'ah* include building monuments on graves, making graves as mosques, and visiting graves for blessings.

And there are some other activities which are less frequent causes of disputes among Muslims but are also considered to be *bid'ah*.

As can be seen that the seventeen activities above can take place in mosques and outside mosques. From these, there are a number of important issues that have most commonly caused disagreements or even conflicts between the anti *bid'ah* movement and other Muslims in a mosque when starting obligatory prayers, during performing prayers, and performing certain recitations or chanting after each prayer. These points are the most important focus of the paper because they are intriguing factors that lead to issues of intolerance. Therefore, they deserve to be treated in some further details. It has to be emphasized that for those who do not follow the same way of practices, as this study also proves, the core problem does not lie in the differences but the intolerant way of the anti *bid'ah* movement in promoting the 'purist' practices against different practices of others.

In addition to the *bid'ah*, the initial and the very core foundation of the problem is methodology of the saved sect (*firqah al-najiyah*) in putting their beliefs into practice. Many of those who consider themselves to be the saved sects need to have responsibility to save the rest of their fellow Muslims. Those who consider themselves to be the saved sect *but* do not feel responsible to save the rest will be condemned by God. Those who feel responsible to save the rest by means of tolerant and acceptable ways, such as discussions, are not around during the time prayers to be performed. Those who feel responsible to save the rest by means of intolerant, be they are their own mosques or in other mosques, are always there during the time prayers. Hence, this kind of disagreement will never end.

In most previous studies, these all have been connected to the background of Wahabism and Salafism. But this study is an attempt to look at the topic from a different perspective. If there are political aspects to be touched, it is only for the purpose to help us understand

the focus of the study but not being core part of the discussion. In addition, Wahabism in the field of Islamic studies until two decades ago or so was regarded as part of Islamic reform. Even the act of Ibnu Saud which was supported by Wahabism in destroying sacred places of Islam in the second decade of the 1900s was ignored or even regarded as part of modernization process.

However, Wahabism has been lately put into the study of radical Islam or worst, terrorism. For example Schwartz's, with his *Two Faces of Islam*, asserts that Muhammad Ibn Abd Wahab is "the first known exemplar of totalitarianism" which of course does not fit into a modernist category.²⁵ Rashid with his *Militant Islam* strongly argues that Wahabism has had inspired the contemporary jihadist movement.²⁶ It has to be acknowledged, however, that the philosophical and theological roots of anti *bid'ah* are necessary to be briefly discussed where peripheral aspect of Wahhabism and Salafism is unavoidable to be touched.

Academically, studies on *anti bid'ah* movement has been better known as *salafi* movement. However, for the purpose of this paper, I tend to apply *anti bid'ah* movement as such which is more specific and try to avoid too much of practical and political nuance in the first place although the implication to political realm is unavoidable. Thus, this paper will not apply organizational approach to the focus of discussion such as in the case of Noorhaidi Hasan.²⁷ His research focuses particular attention to the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Front of the Defenders of Islam), the Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Indonesia's Party of Liberation), the Laskar Jihad (LJ, Jihad Paramilitary Force), the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (LMI, Indonesian Holy Warrior Force), and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). It does, however, assess further implication of what Noorhaidi found that 'Islamist militants do not currently pose a significant threat to Indonesia's security as many have shifted their strategy of violent jihad toward nonviolent Islamic missionary work in the grassroots in the form of "Islamization from

²⁵ S. Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* (New York: Doubleday, 2002), p. 74.

²⁶ A. Rashid, *Taliban, Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

²⁷ N. Hasan, "Transnational Islam in Indonesia," in N. P. Report, *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics* (NBA Project Report, 2009), pp. 121-140.

below'.²⁸ When NU ulama or scholars explicitly proclaim that they have left NU or the ways of NU interpretation and practice of Islam (as will be detailed later), it has to be regarded as a significant threat to religious harmony and tolerance if this proclamation took place in a mosque affiliated to NU or traditional Islam in general. This is what this paper intends to argue partly in the next section.

After a long time period, Indonesia has been regarded as a model of tolerant country for the rest of Muslim world, such as Islam, the ideology of tolerance where Ramage refers to NU and its leader Abdurrahman Wahid as a model of religious tolerance in the country.²⁹ Toward the end of 2010 until the first half of 2012, however, Indonesians have witnessed many cases of intolerant acts toward minority groups in Indonesia. This was proven by a number of surveys conducted by highly reliable institutions of surveys, such as LSI (Indonesian Survey Institute) and CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) as well as the Wahid Institute. The Wahid Institute, for example, reports that the cases of intolerance in Indonesia in 2012 rise by 30 percent and most cases are rooted in religious issues. Cases that were covered by such surveys were the burning of churches in a number of places, Ahmadiyah cases in West Java, Shi'a case in Sampang and some others which concerned minority groups.

In the context of Islamic studies in Indonesia, anti *bid'ah* propagation entered the country in the first decade of the 20th century which was marked by the establishment of Muhammadiyah as the biggest organization. It was, however, later regarded as modernist movement. Other organizations such as the Islamic Union (Persis) and other smaller organizations that came later with similar characters, such as Shiratal Mustaqim in South Sulawesi that were not so appealing to be followed by Indonesian Muslims. Until the last decade of the New Order government, the anti *bid'ah* still used Muhammadiyah as the biggest umbrella organizationally. But since the fall of the Soeharto regime, better known as the Reform Era, anti *bid'ah* movement of those who are not members of Muhammadiyah had no longer used the organization as the tent organization. This is particularly due to the

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ D. E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 25-46.

discontent against Muhammadiyah performance in eradicating what were considered as *bid'ah* and more tolerant toward Muslims who are regarded practicing *bid'ah*. I argue that the present anti *bid'ah* movement can no longer be fully associated with Muhammadiyah. Therefore, I propose a new name for the movement that does not have the name organizationally, that is Neo-anti *Bid'ah*. Neo-anti *bid'ah* can be defined as the revival of anti *bid'ah* movement that was once rampant in Indonesia until the early 1980s with Muhammadiyah as the main umbrella organizationally. But two decades after the 1980s until the early 2000s, this movement experienced ups and downs, especially because this movement raised tension among Muslims. As a result, the anti *bid'ah* movement that was once widespread then declined and later incarnated in the form of rejuvenation with similarities and differences between the previous and the present. Eradicating *bid'ah* has no longer the main activities of Muhammadiyah or at least the old way of purifying Indonesian Muslims from *bid'ah* is no more preferred.

Furthermore, the anti *bid'ah* with the jargon of anti TBC (*Tabayul Bid'ah Churafat*, superstition, innovation and heresy) after encountering resistance and challenges from traditional Islam and moderate intellectuals within the body of Muhammadiyah, famously bearers of cultural missionary movement, they generally broadcast and propagate through mosques, educational institutions, study groups which they built by themselves. At that time, this movement can be considered as an ideological movement that was broadcast through various wings of this organization. While the Neo-anti *Bid'ah* movement is not an umbrella organization itself nor affiliated to Muhammadiyah. Another difference, they use the traditionalist Islamic mosques which are mostly affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama. They went into educational institutions and traditional Islamic teaching and for the time being there has been no institution they built by themselves.

Mosque as Islamic Public Space: Beyond Ritualistic Function

By applying Jurgen Habermas theory of public sphere, particularly concerning norms and modes of behavior that should prevail in public sphere, (a) general accessibility, (b) elimination of all privileges and (c) discovery of general norms and rational legitimations,³⁰ what I mean by Islamic public space is the place where every Muslim should be

³⁰ Jurgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article," *New Germany Critique*, No. 3 (Autumn, 1974), Footnote number 3, p. 50.

guaranteed to have free access without any disturbance by any other group of Muslims, be they belong to the same school of thought in the mosques or not. There should be no group who believe to having particular privileges that they are the only “correct” Islam and thus having the right to drive other Muslims off particular mosques. Should there be general norms to be promoted, they should be based on rational legitimations not by a belief or a particular interpretation while different interpretations are also possible. This also should be discussed in appropriate time and place.

Mosque, according to al-Sadiq al-Nayhum, was the premier public space in the Islamic world, which had similar function as the agora in the ancient Greek city and the public square in the medieval Western city.³¹ In addition to a place for performing Islamic regular prayers, Muslims make use of mosques as place of gatherings to discuss religious and social matters. Therefore, mosque has become important symbols for every Muslim.³² However, due to different understandings and practices of Islam for different groups of Muslims, mosque has also become a contested public sphere.³³ In a way, when someone thinks that he or she has more knowledge than the others, he or she has the right to exclude the others from certain mosques. According Turner, “exclusion is now seen to be a matter of natural talents which some people develop and others do not” ... “successful people are incessantly on the move, while the unsuccessful that are seen to have squandered their talents are characterised by their social and spatial fixity”.³⁴ This is called ‘the connexionist world’.

This is a picture of mosque role since the life of the Prophet Muhammad up to the contemporary Muslims world. For many Muslim countries in the world today, where there are particular buildings to have gatherings, the most common place to gather and to socialize is still mosque, because Muslims meet in mosques regularly every day, seven days a week (and at least) in every four hours a day in the

³¹ N. Rabbat, “The Arab Revolution Takes Back the Public Space,” *Critical Inquiry*, 39, 1 (2012): pp. 198-208.

³² B. Metcalf, *Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1996); D. Joly, *Britannia's Crescent* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995).

³³ B.S. Turner, “Managing Religions: State Responses to Religious Diversity,” *Contemporary Islam*, 1 (2007), pp. 123-137.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 129.

average. The most attended gatherings are Friday congregation which is organized once a week. This is in addition to other social and cultural activities which are linked to Islamic teachings and which are initiated from ritual activities held in mosques. The only differences across the Muslim world are the expansion to variety of issues beyond religion to be discussed, the quality and quantity of gatherings, and of what age who usually use mosque for gatherings.³⁵

In a sense my study on the response of Jambi Malay Muslims toward anti *bid'ah* movement is similar to McLoughlin who asserts that conflicts over the Islamisation of public space often reveals majority fears about the erosion of a 'British way of life', which is similar to Jambi Malay Muslims as the majority in this study.³⁶ However, McLoughlin study focuses more on problems faced by non-Muslims majority, thus between people inside a mosque and those who are outside, while my paper focuses on a group of Muslims as a majority in encountering their own fellow Muslims from minority.

There are a number of characteristics that should always be considered in order to make it democratically plausible or acceptable public space. The most important thing is there should always be awareness of those who perform prayers in every mosque that there should no argument or physical fight among prayer participants, particularly whenever a prayer is about to start. Even an *imam* (a prayer leader) cannot impose a particular interpretation of Islam while a prayer is about to start. If an *imam* wants to teach particular understanding, particularly which is different or against the usual ways performed in a mosque, he should do it during teaching time in school or a discussions in a mosque but not when a prayer is about to start or soon after prayers have been done. These two points of time are the moment when Muslims are concentrating their mind to their God which should be free from interference for whatever reason.

³⁵ See S. McLoughlin, "The Mosque-centre, Community-mosque: Multi-functions, Funding and the Reconstruction of Islam in Bradford," *Scottish Journal of Religious Studies*, 19, 2 (1998): pp. 211-227; M.T. Rasdi, *The Mosque as a Community Development Centre: Programme and Architectural Design Guidelines for Contemporary Muslim Societies* (Skudai, Johor Darul Ta'zim: Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 1998); R.A. Chaudhri, *Mosque: Its Importance in the Life of a Muslim* (London: The London Mosque, 1982); A.I. Kahera, *Deconstructing the American Mosque: Space, Gender, and Aesthetics* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002).

³⁶ McLoughlin, "The Mosque-centre, Community-mosque", p. 1046.

It should be noticed that there are two possibilities when an Islamic public space becomes private or semi-private.³⁷ As cases in many Muslim countries in the world where there are mosques or other places for performing prayers that are built by particular organizations or family, such Islamic public place would become private or semi private. Muslim can join in and perform their prayers but they could not discuss other social and cultural issues without having permission from the owner. First, in Indonesia, there are mosques that are built by Muhammadiyah from Jakarta down to villages. This kind of mosque, although it has never been stated so, is private because other group of Muslims cannot have access to organize their social and cultural activities as they do on their own. Second, similar case also applied to *langgar* or mushalla which are built by rich or big families in certain urban areas. There are possibility that Muslim from outside the owner family could still make use such mosque but with prior permission from the owner. Of course there is no written regulation, but Indonesian Muslims just do it that way for the sake of toleration. This kind of mosque can hardly be categorized as public space in the same way mentioned above, they are private or semi-private.

Why should Islamic public space matter? In the last few years, especially after the introduction of direct regional election in Indonesia, politicians have made use of any media in order to get support from voters, including mosque. For those who have already had connections with their Muslim fellows, they keenly use places of worships to introduce their intention to compete for particular regional election. In addition, this is particularly applicable for politicians who officially affiliate to political parties that state promoting Islamic values. Therefore, for Muslims to have healthy democratic society, Islamic public space, such as mosque, should always be openly assessed.

Conclusion

This study has shown that mosques in Jambi Malay Muslim communities have become contested place of two difference ways of practicing Islamic teachings. This contestation has created potentials of internal religious conflicts among Muslims. One way is considered by certain group as *bid'ah* per se and thus should be avoided while the

³⁷ J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1989).

other group considers it as *bid'ah hasanah* that can be conducted. Taking into consideration that there have been a number of moderate followers of Islam (such as of traditionalist Islam or NU) who have got rid off their own mosques which they have accupied since the foundation of the certain mosques, this is not minority being insecure aganist the presence of neo-anti *bid'ah* movement. It is, however, insecurity of the majority. Further, it can be argued that there are also a connotation between and “correct Islam” vs. “incorrect Islam”. This might in turn have implication back to political Islam though it might not be directly seen. However, looking at the general narrative of this paper, the neo-anti *bid'ah* movement in Jambi Malay Muslims does not seem to have any connection with ‘Arab Spring’ both in its relations to Wahabism or Salafism from political perspective.

The final implication I want to draw concerns the choice of moderate traditionalist Muslims against the radical promotion of neo-anti *bid'ah*, particularly the ‘humble’ choice of leaving their own mosques for the sake of harmonious life and avoiding arguments or conflicts. This is to say that religious piety can be maintained with a cost of reducing one’s ego for the sake of social harmony. In other words, there will be reduction of the role of the mosque as a public space because it had become a forced private space. This certainly is not good for a healthy democratic society. A maturity in managing Islamic public space in which social harmonious life can be maintained is highly in demand.

In addition, for the future trajectory of being a democratic society, however, the harmonious life outside the mosques is actually hiding a time bomb which might explode in the future when those who have left their mosques want to go back to their mosques. Pretending harmonius life is in fact not a good strategy for a healthy democratic society for a long term. What Muslims need is mutual recognition with justification.³⁸ Every group of Muslims can make use of mosque for both religious and social matters so long as disagreement can be solved with appropriate time and place.

There is nothing wrong to consider Indonesian Muslims as tolerant country when it deals with other minority groups in the country. However, the silence of the majority (significant number of Muslims) where there are small groups of them acted intolerantly

³⁸ D. Rasmussen, “Mutual Recognition: No Justification without Legitimation,” *Philosophy Social Criticism*, 38 (2012), pp. 893-899.

toward them might be of high value to be taken into consideration when one wants to see the whole picture of contemporary Indonesia as a tolerant country.[]

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